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Abstract
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the welfare effect
of public information. In an environment characterized by imperfect com-
mon knowledge and strategic complementarities, Morris and Shin (2002)
argue that noisy public information may be detrimental to welfare because
public information is attributed too large a weight relative to its face value
since it serves as a focal point. While this argument has received a great
deal of attention in central banks and in the financial press, it considers
communication as the sole task of a central bank and ignores that commu-
nication usually goes with a policy action. This paper accounts for the ac-
tion task of a central bank and analyzes whether public disclosure is benefi-
cial in the conduct of monetary policy when the central bank primarily tries
to stabilize the economy with an instrument that is optimal with respect to
its perhaps mistaken view. In this context, it turns out that transparency
is particularly beneficial when central bank’s information is poorly accu-
rate because it helps reducing the distortion associated with badly suited
policies.
JEL classification: D82, E52, E58.
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1 Introduction
The conduct of monetary policy has been characterized by an important switch
from secrecy to transparency over the last decades. Central banks talk much
more openly about their policy decisions today than they used to do in the
last decades. While central bankers thought they could better achieve their tar-
get by acting in secret and taking the markets by surprise, it seems that trans-
parency has nowadays become the new paradigm.
This trend in central banking has given rise to a growing literature about the
pros and cons of higher transparency. In particular, the literature has recently
raised questions about the value of having central banks provide more and
better information to the public. For decisions made under uncertainty, more
accurate information usually permits that decisions are better suited to the
underlying fundamental. But macroeconomic environments also often entail
strategic complementarities in decision making. As Keynes pointed out in his
beauty contest example, decision makers face the dilemma of matching some
fundamental of the economy and coordinating with the decision of others.1
While both public information and private information play an equivalent role
in guessing the fundamental, public information plays a preponderant role in
guessing the decision of others because it is common to all agents and thereby
better helps predicting their expectations. So, individual agents assign a higher
weight to public information than justified by its informative value since it
serves as a focal point. Public information is therefore extremely effective in
shaping market outcomes.
In their seminal beauty contest paper, Morris and Shin (2002) (henceforth M-S)
highlight that the disclosure of noisy public information may be detrimental
to welfare because the overreaction to it may distort the market outcome away
from the fundamental. They conclude that, if there is some upper bound in the
precision of its information, the central bank may be better off withholding its
information. Their argument has received a great deal of attention in central
banks2 and in the financial press3 because it seems to contradict the general
presumption that transparency is beneficial.
Yet, the literature in the vein of M-S analyzes the welfare effect of public in-
formation when the only task of the central bank is to communicate with the
public, i.e. to disclose or withhold its information. Typically it ignores that
the primarily task of a central bank is to take action by implementing a mone-
tary instrument. While communication is certainly a key component of mone-
tary policy, the action implemented by a central bank must not be ignored for
1See Keynes (1936) p. 157.
2See for example Kohn (2005) and Issing (2005).
3See The Economist (2004).
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all that. This paper argues that information policy must be thought within a
framework that also considers the primarily task of the central bank, namely
its action. Indeed, information disclosure – if any – rarely occurs alone but usu-
ally goes with policy implementation. More importantly, one must be aware
that the action implemented by a central bank is chosen according to its per-
haps noisy information. When the central bank has a mistaken view about
the economic outcome (because of inevitable forecast errors) its stabilization
policy may well turn out to be rather distorting. Thus, the question of trans-
parency must account for the fact that the central bank’s action suffers from the
same distortion as its disclosure. One may thus ask how a central bank should
communicate with the public when the monetary instrument it implements is
distorted by noisy information. Should the central bank implement its instru-
ment in secret to avoid the private sector’s overreaction to its mistaken view?
Or should it, on the contrary, bring its viewpoint to light?
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the welfare effect of public
information when disclosure goes with action. It especially develops the idea
that – as opposed to M-S – transparency reduces the distortion of monetary
policy. We consider a model of monopolistic competition with imperfect com-
mon knowledge where firms’ prices are strategic complements. The economy
is hit by demand shocks and firms set their price according to their own belief
about the output gap and their expectations about the belief of others. Our
analysis is constructed into two steps.
First, we discuss in section 3 the transparency effect in the case where informa-
tion disclosure is the only purpose of the central bank. Central bank’s dis-
closure reduces the fundamental and strategic uncertainty. This set-up not
surprisingly yields the same conclusion as M-S, namely that the central bank
should withhold its information whenever it is rather noisy and when the de-
gree of strategic complementarities is high. In this context, we introduce the
concept of partial transparency. While M-S consider two extreme kinds of dis-
closure, transparency and opacity, we argue that some intermediate level of
transparency better describes the reality and may be welfare improving. It
is not necessarily true that central bank’s disclosures are common knowledge
among the whole population. Indeed, central banks are known for speaking
with mystique. This makes their disclosures equivocal, open to interpretation,
and prevents them from becoming common knowledge. Greenspan’s testi-
mony to the US Congress in 1987 illustrates the willingness of central bankers
to speak in equivocal manners: “Since I have become a central banker, I have learned
to mumble with great incoherence. If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have mis-
understood what I said." More recently (in December 2002), Mike Moskow, the
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president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, claimed that “[the Fed speak]
is a language in which it is possible to speak, without ever saying anything." Imperfect
or partial transparency can be well rationalized in this context. Since a central
bank’s disclosure may be detrimental to welfare when it is common knowl-
edge, introducing some uncertainty about its interpretation reduces its focal
role and improves the outcome. This argument is close to that of Cornand and
Heinemann (2005) who introduce the notion of partial publicity. They show
that disclosing public information to a limited audience reduces the overreac-
tion to it which can be welfare increasing. Depriving some agents of receiving
public information prevents it from becoming common knowledge among the
whole population. But while under partial publicity the disclosure is common
knowledge among the limited audience (only), under partial transparency the
disclosure is private to each firm. In this respect, partial transparency is simi-
lar to Heinemann and Illing (2002) who argue – within a game of speculative
attack – that central banks should provide information to each agent in pri-
vate with some idiosyncratic noise to avoid common knowledge (and yields
equilibrium uniqueness).
Second, section 4 presents the case where the central bank tries to stabilize the
economy by implementing a monetary instrument. As discussed below, cen-
tral banks have become much more transparent about their instrument over
the last decades. We show that full transparency is then preferable to partial
transparency. The intuition behind this finding is as follows. Since the cen-
tral bank tries to stabilize the economy based on its information, central bank’s
errors influence the economic outcome even if central bank’s information re-
mains unknown to firms. The central bank’s mistaken view distorts the econ-
omy even under opacity. The disclosure policy of the central bank however
influences firms’ reaction and the price level because the monetary instrument
is part of the output gap, the fundamental firms have to respond to. Under
transparency, firms’ response accounts for the monetary instrument and this
reduces the distorting effect of central bank’s action. For instance, if the central
bank contracts the economy bymistake, prices better offset the mistaken policy
action when firms’ reaction to the instrument is maximal, i.e. when the instru-
ment is common knowledge among firms. Opacity is however optimal in this
set-up for a very small and rather unrealistic range of parameter values. But
interestingly, we show that the case for opacity shrinks when central bank’s in-
formation becomes less accurate: while the monetary instrument increasingly
distorts the output gap, transparency, by strengthening the response of firms
to central bank’s action, attenuates the distortion. Transparency is therefore
particularly beneficial when the central bank has a very mistaken view of the
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state of the economy.
Section 5 compares the optimal disclosure in our two frameworks and empha-
sizes the benefit of transparency when the central bank tries to stabilize the
economy. As a result, taking the action task of the central bank into consider-
ation strongly contrasts with M-S according to which transparency is welfare
detrimental when the central bank’s information is poorly accurate. And fi-
nally, section 6 concludes.
2 The economy
The model is derived from an economy with flexible prices, populated by a
representative household, a continuum of monopolistic competitive firms, and
a central bank. The economy is hit by stochastic demand shocks. Nominal
aggregate demand is determined by both the demand shock and the monetary
instrument set by the central bank. The baseline framework is close to Adam
(2006).
2.1 Representative household
The representative household chooses its aggregate composite good C and la-
bor supply H in order to maximize its utility subject to its budget constraint,
gU(C)− V (H) (1)
s.t. WH + Π = PC.
The parameter g is a stochastic demand shock, that induces variations in the
efficient level of output. The utility function has the following usual properties:
U ′ > 0, U ′′ < 0, limC→∞ U
′(C) = 0, V ′ > 0, V ′′ < 0, and V ′(0) < U ′(0). C is
the composite good defined by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator
C =
[ ∫ 1
0
(Ci)
θ−1
θ di
] θ
θ−1
(2)
where θ > 1 is the parameter of price elasticity of demand and where Ci is the
good produced by firm i. W denotes the competitive wage and Π the profits
the household gets from firms. P is the appropriate price index which solves
PC =
∫ 1
0
PiCidi and satisfies
P =
[ ∫ 1
0
P 1−θi di
] 1
1−θ
.
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Given the overall level of consumption, the household allocates its expenditure
across goods according to
Ci =
(
Pi
P
)
−θ
C (3)
and optimizing the consumption-labor decision leads to the real wage
W
P
=
V ′(H)
gU ′(C)
. (4)
2.2 Firms
Each firm i produces a single differentiated good Ci with one unit of labor Hi
according to the simple production function
Hi = Ci. (5)
The profit maximization problem of firm i is given by
max
Pi
E[PiCi(Pi)−WHi(Pi)|Ii], (6)
where Ii is the information set of firm i. Using (3), (4), and (5), the first order
condition of (6) becomes
E
[
(1− θ)
(
Pi
P
)
−θ
+ θ
(
Pi
P
)
−θ−1
V ′(C)
gU ′(C)
|Ii
]
= 0. (7)
Linearizing (7) around the steady state delivers
pi = Ei[p + ξc], (8)
where small letters indicate percentage deviation from the steady state and
where
ξ = −
U ′′(C¯)C¯
U ′(C¯)
+
V ′′(C¯)C¯
V ′(C¯)
.
C¯ is the real output at its steady state level.
The pricing rule (8) states that firms set their price as a function of their ex-
pectations of the overall price level p and the real output gap c. The parame-
ter ξ determines in what extent the optimal price responds to the output gap.
Firms strongly respond to the output gap when it has a strong impact on the
competitive real wage. This occurs when the household’s utility and disutility
functions are very concave and convex, respectively, i.e. when ξ is large. In
this case, the real wage required for additional production is high (since the
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household derives a low utility from additional consumption while it suffers
a high disutility from additional work) and firms strongly adjust their price
to the output gap. We qualify as “weakly extensive" an economy with a high
value of ξ and as “highly extensive" an economy with a low value of ξ.
In this context, ξ captures the effectiveness of monetary policy for influencing
the price level. As we assume later on, the central bank partially determines
the nominal aggregate demand through its monetary instrument. In the case
where the economy is highly extensive, output gap deviations have small im-
pacts on the competitive real wage and thus on the price level. The monetary
instrument is consequently weakly effective at influencing the price level.
ξ also determines whether prices are strategic complements or substitutes. Us-
ing the fact that the nominal aggregate demand (deviation) y can be expressed
as y = c + p, we rewrite the pricing rule (8) as
pi = Ei[(1− ξ)p + ξy]. (9)
In the whole paper, we assume that prices are strategic complements, i.e. ξ ≤ 1.
This assumption seems very natural and captures the concept of beauty contest
introduced by Keynes.
2.3 Central bank
The current paper underlines the relevance of two central bank’s tasks, namely
information disclosure and policy implementation. In section 3, the central
bank is supposed to influence the economy with the disclosure of its infor-
mation about demand shocks exclusively. By contrast, section 4 additionally
accounts for the monetary policy I implemented by the central bank. Themon-
etary instrument is then supposed to partially determined the nominal aggre-
gate demand up to the demand shock g. The nominal aggregate demand y is
the sum of the central bank’s instrument I (if any) and of the demand shock g,
i.e. y = I + g. The demand shock is drawn from a uniform distribution over
the real line: g ∈ R.
2.4 Welfare
The welfare is defined as the utility of the representative household. One can
show that in the economy described above, thewelfare is decreasing in both the
dispersion of prices across firms
∫
i
(pi − p)
2di and the variability of the output
gap c = y − p. Since there is currently no consensus about how coordination
is socially valuable relative to macroeconomic distortion, we define a generic
welfare function that accounts for alternative weights assigned to coordination.
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So, the social loss is given by
L =
∫
i
(pi − p)
2di + λc2, (10)
where λ is the weight assigned to the output gap variability. The welfare func-
tion used in the transparency debate of M-S is a matter of controversy since the
detrimental effect of transparency is driven by the relative relevance of coordi-
nation and stabilization at the social level. The application of theM-S argument
to different welfare functions may lead to different conclusions. For example,
Hellwig (2005) and Woodford (2005) show that when coordination is socially
highly valuable, transparency is welfare improving as it helps coordinating
firms’ price setting. In their model, the potential destabilizing effect of trans-
parency is neglected. The welfare function (10) is generic since the coefficient
λ describes the relative importance of coordination for the society as a whole.
As discussed below, the welfare function derived in the seminal beauty contest
paper by M-S −
∫
i
(pi − g)
2di is captured by the loss (10) when the weight as-
signed to coordination is equal to that assigned to output gap distortion, that
is to say when λ = 1. The loss (10) can also replicate the microfounded welfare
that assigns a much strong weight on coordination at the social level. Adam
(2006) shows that the weight assigned to the output gap distortion when the
welfare is microfounded amounts to λ = ξ
θ
, where θ > 1 is the degree of sub-
stitutability in the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator.
3 Pure information disclosure
This section analyzes the welfare effect of public information when the central
bank does not influence the economy except with its information disclosure.
The aim of this section is to illustrate the much debated result by M-S where
information disclosure is the only task of the central bank. Since the central
bank does not implement any action, we set I = 0 and rewrite the pricing rule
(9) as
pi = Ei
[
(1− ξ)p + ξg
]
. (11)
One may worry about the fact that the central bank does not offset demand
shocks in the present economy and claim that this is not optimal. However,
the aim of this paper is not to address the merits of having a central bank sta-
bilizing the economy but to compare the welfare effect of disclosure in the case
where the central bank does not stabilize the economy to the case where it
does. So, the present section must be seen as a benchmark case that replicates
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the results by M-S and allows a better suited comparison.
We describe the information structure in the next section. Then, we discuss the
optimal information disclosure first when the central bank chooses between
full transparency and opacity (i.e. the central bank either perfectly reveals its
opinion or totally withholds it), and second when the central bank can choose
its optimal degree of transparency (i.e. the central bank speaks with some am-
biguity).
3.1 Information structure
To take its pricing decision, each firm receives two signals. First, each firm gets
a private signal about the demand shock that may be interpreted as a private
opinion. The private signal is centred on the true value of g and has a normally
distributed error term:
gi = g + εi with εi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε),
where εi are identically and independently distributed across firms.
Second, firms get a signal disclosed by the central bank. The central bank im-
perfectly observes the demand shock: it receives a signal on the demand shock
that is centred on its true value and contains a normally distributed error term:
D = g + η with η ∼ N(0, σ2η).
The central bank provides firms with its viewpoint about the demand shock.
As discussed in the introduction, the central bank communicates its informa-
tion D with more or less ambiguity. For the sake of generality, we write the
signal disclosed by the central bank and received by firm i as
Di = g + η + φi with φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ).
The dispersion of individual noises σ2φ determines the degree of transparency
of the central bank. Under transparency, every firm gets the same univocal
signal (σ2φ = 0). Then, the central bank’s informationD is a public signal that is
common knowledge among all firms. Under opacity, the individual signal got
by each firm has an infinite idiosyncratic noise (σ2φ → ∞). The central bank’s
information thus does not contain any valuable information. One can imagine
any intermediate situation where the central bank provides firms with more or
less equivocal information.
The introduction of idiosyncratic noise in central bank’s disclosure reduces its
degree of common knowledge among firms. This communication strategy has
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been proposed by Heinemann and Illing (2002) who address the issue of cen-
tral bank disclosing information to every agent in private within a game of
speculative attack. Cornand and Heinemann (2005) propose another disclo-
sure strategy that also reduces the degree of common knowledge: the disclo-
sure of a public signalD to a fraction S of firms. The disclosureD thus becomes
semi-public as the fraction 1−S of firms does not receive it but only gets its pri-
vate signal gi.
4 Appendix A shows that both disclosure strategies – i.e. limited
transparency vs. limited publicity – are strictly equivalent in terms of welfare.
More precisely, this appendix shows that the equivalence relationship between
the degree of transparency σ2φ and the degree of publicity S is given by
σ2φ =
1− S
S
(σ2ε + σ
2
η) or S =
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
In the remainder of the paper, we will however only address the question of
optimal degree of transparency.
3.2 Equilibrium
This section derives the perfect Bayesian equilibrium behaviour of firms. We
recall the optimal pricing rule (11) for convenience and substitute successively
the average price level with higher-order expectations about the cost-push shock
and the monetary instrument
pi = Ei
[
(1− ξ)p + ξg
]
= Ei
[
ξg + (1− ξ)
[
E¯[ξg + (1− ξ)[E¯[ξg + . . .]]]
]]
.
We denote by Ei(.) the expectation operator of firm i conditional on its infor-
mation and by E¯(.) the average expectation operator such that E¯(.) =
∫
i
Ei(.)di.
With heterogeneous information, the law of iterated expectations fails and ex-
pectations of higher-order do not collapse to the average expectation of degree
one.5 Thus, we rewrite the pricing rule as
pi = ξ
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)kEi
[
E¯
(k)(g)
]
,
4Some other way to disclose fragmented information is introduced in Morris and Shin (2006).
5See Morris and Shin (2002).
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and averaging over firms yields
p = ξ
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
[
E¯
(k+1)(g)
]
, (12)
where E¯(k) stands for the higher-order expectation of degree k. We use the
following notation of higher-order expectations: E¯(0)(x) = x is the expected
variable x itself, E¯(1)(x) = E¯(x) is the average expectation of x, E¯(2)(x) =
E¯E¯
(1)(x) = E¯E¯(x) is the average expectation of the average expectation of x,
and so on.
To determine the optimal price rule (12), we build the first and higher-order
expectations of firm i about the demand shock g conditional on its information.
The expectation of degree one about the demand shock Ei(g) yields
E(g|gi, Di) =
σ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
gi +
σ2ε
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
Di = Ω11gi + Ω12Di. (13)
The best estimate of the demand shock by firm i is an average of its both sig-
nals whose weighting depends upon their relative precision. To compute the
higher-order expectations of firm i, one needs also to know the expectation of
degree one of the central bank’s average disclosure Ei(D). This delivers
E(D|gi, Di) =
σ2φ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
gi +
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
Di = Ω21gi + Ω22Di. (14)
Note that under transparency (when σ2φ = 0), the central bank’s disclosure is
univocal and Ω21 = 0 which means that the private signal gi does not help
guessing D. Under opacity, when the idiosyncratic noise is infinite (σ2φ → ∞),
the central bank’s disclosure is of no use to estimate the demand shock g and
the best estimate is the private signal gi itself (Ω11 = 1).
Using these results, we can express the higher-order expectations of degree k
as
E¯
(k)
(
g
D
)
=
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
)k (
g
D
)
.
Plugging this into the price rule (12), we get
p =
(
ξ 0
) ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
(
Ω11 Ω12
Ω21 Ω22
)k+1 (
g
D
)
. (15)
The price rule is a linear combination of the demand shock and the central
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bank’s disclosure. Appendix B shows that the price rule is given by
p = γ1g + γ2D with (16)
γ1 =
Ω11ξ + (1− ξ)Ω21
1− (1− ξ)(Ω11 − Ω21)
=
ξσ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
γ2 =
ξΩ12 + (1− ξ)Ω12Ω21
ξ − (1− ξ)[Ω11ξ − (1 + ξ)Ω21 − (1− ξ)(Ω21 − Ω11)Ω11]
=
σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
γ1 and γ2 sum up to 1. The equilibrium firms’ action can be interpreted as a
weighted average of the fundamental g and the average disclosure D. Note
however that the weight assigned to the central bank’s disclosure is larger in
the equilibrium action (γ2) than in the best estimate of g given in (13): γ2 > Ω12.
This discrepancy arises because of the coordination motive in the pricing rule.
While εi and φi are idiosyncratic noises, the central bank’s error term η is com-
monly observed by all firms through the disclosure Di. The weight assigned
to the central bank’s error (and thereby to Di) increases as the coordination
motive strengthens: strategic complementarities raise the incentive of firms to
coordinate their action around the central bank’s disclosure. When the degree
of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ increases, the weight assigned to the pri-
vate signal gi declines (
∂γ1
∂ξ
> 0) while the weight assigned to central bank’s
disclosure increases (∂γ2
∂ξ
< 0). When the degree of transparency increases (σ2φ
falls), the weight put on the central bank’s disclosure Di increases since its in-
terpretation becomes less ambiguous and better conducive to guess the action
of others ( ∂γ1
∂σ2
φ
> 0 and ∂γ2
∂σ2
φ
< 0). Signals are also given a higher weight when
their precision increases: ∂γ1
∂σ2ε
< 0 and ∂γ2
∂σ2η
< 0.
3.3 Welfare
We now examine the welfare given by (10) in the current informational con-
text. On the one hand, the equilibrium firms’ behaviour (16) implies that the
unconditional expected price dispersion across firms satisfies
E
(∫
i
(pi − p)
2di
)
= E
(∫
i
(γ1gi + γ2Di − γ1g − γ2D)
2di
)
= γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ.
On the other hand, the unconditional output gap expectation is
E
(
c2
)
= E(g − p)2 = E(g − γ1g − γ2D)
2 = γ22σ
2
η.
So, the unconditional expected social loss can be written as
E(L) = γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ + λγ
2
2σ
2
η (17)
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=
σ2ε(λσ
2
η + σ
2
φ) + (ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
2
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
2
σ2ε .
Let us now discuss the welfare considered in M-S and given by−
∫
i
(pi− g)
2di.
We write the corresponding loss as
E(LMS) = E
( ∫
i
(pi − g)
2di
)
= E
( ∫
i
(γ1(g + εi) + γ2(g + η + φi)− g)
2di
)
= γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ + γ
2
2σ
2
η.
This implies that the welfare in M-S is a particular case of our general formu-
lation (17) where λ = 1. This means that the model of M-S equally weights
coordination and stabilization at the social level.
The welfare effect of the central bank’s disclosure is analyzed in the next sec-
tions. We first restrict the discussion to the binary case of transparency vs.
opacity. This is the perspective of M-S where the central bank either discloses a
public signal (that is common knowledge) or withholds its information. Then,
we allow for intermediate level of transparency and derive the optimal degree
of transparency.
3.4 Transparency versus opacity
Opacity The welfare is calculated when the central bank withholds its infor-
mation, i.e. σ2φ → ∞. Under opacity, firms set their price equal to their private
signal gi, i.e. γ1 = 1 and γ2 = 0. The resulting expected loss is
E(LO) = E
( ∫
i
(γ1(g + εi)− γ1g)
2di + λ(g − γ1g)
2
)
= σ2ε .
The overall price level p is equal to the fundamental g. The price dispersion
across firms is given by the variance of the idiosyncratic noise εi.
Transparency Under transparency, disclosure of the central bank is common
knowledge (σ2φ = 0) and the pricing rule of firms becomes
p =
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
g +
σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
D.
The resulting expected loss is
E(LT ) =
( ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
)2
σ2ε + λ
( σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
)2
σ2η.
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Transparency is welfare improving when the loss under opacity LO is larger
than the loss under transparency LT . The welfare analysis of transparency
yields the following proposition:
Proposition 1: When the central bank’s unique task is information disclosure, full
transparency is preferable to opacity when
λ− 2ξ <
σ2ε
σ2η
. (18)
This finding is in line with M-S: transparency is welfare detrimental whenever
public information is too noisy relative to private information (
σ2ε
σ2η
small), when
the degree of strategic complementarities is rather high (ξ small), and when
coordination is socially not too valuable (λ large). When complementarities
are sufficiently low such that λ − 2ξ < 0, transparency is always beneficial
since variances of error terms are positive by definition (σ2. ≥ 0).
The general framework developed in this paper shows in what extent the wel-
fare effect of transparency is related to the social value of coordination. In the
case of M-S, as λ = 1, private information must be more accurate than public
information for transparency to be detrimental. The left-hand side of inequa-
tion (18) is always smaller than one. For the right-hand side to be smaller
than the left-hand one, the central bank’s noise σ2η must be larger than the pri-
vate noise σ2ε . Since information of public institutions (like central banks) is
typically more accurate than information privately available6, Svensson (2006)
argues that the detrimental effect of transparency emphasized in the beauty
contest framework of M-S arises under unrealistic conditions.
But if the social value of coordination is smaller than in M-S (λ > 1), opacity
may be superior even when public information is more accurate than private
information (this arises when λ−2ξ > 1). This means that the pertinence of the
critique of Svensson strongly depends on the coordination value at the social
level.
3.5 Optimal degree of transparency
In the former section, the central bank could either disclose its noisy informa-
tion with perfect precision or withhold it. In reality, however, central bankers
are known for mumbling with ambiguity. This makes central bank’s disclo-
sures open to interpretation. The more a central bank speaks in an equivocal
6For instance, in an empirical analysis on US data, Romer and Romer (2000) show that the Fed
better forecasts the output and inflation than any single private commercial bank.
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manner, the higher the uncertainty about the interpretation of the disclosure
(fundamental uncertainty) and the higher the uncertainty about its interpreta-
tion by others (strategic uncertainty). When full transparency is detrimental to
welfare relative to opacity, reducing transparency may improve welfare. But
even when full transparency is preferable to opacity, partial transparency may
yield a superior outcome. What is the optimal degree of transparency for a
central bank to disclose its information?
To determine the optimal degree of transparency σ2∗φ , weminimize the loss (17)
with respect to σ2φ and set it equal to zero:
∂E(L)
∂σ2φ
= 2γ1
∂γ1
∂σ2φ
σ2ε + γ
2
2 + 2γ2
∂γ2
∂σ2φ
σ2φ + 2λγ2
∂γ2
∂σ2φ
σ2η
=
(σ2ε + (3ξ − 2λ)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ)σ
4
ε
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
3
= 0 ⇔ σ2φ = (2λ− 3ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε . (19)
Deriving the optimal degree of transparency in the framework described above,
we get the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When the central bank’s unique task is information disclosure, the
optimal degree of transparency is given by
σ2∗φ = max[0, (2λ− 3ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε ]. (20)
.
This analysis calls for partial transparency when coordination is not very valu-
able at the social level (λ large), when the degree of strategic complementarities
is high (ξ small), and/or when the central bank’s information is rather noisy
(σ2η large).
Implementing the optimal degree of transparency (20) yields the following ex-
pected welfare:
E(L∗) = min
[ (λσ2ε + ξ2σ2η)σ2εσ2η
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η)
2
,
4σ2η(ξ − λ) + σ
2
ε
4σ2η(ξ − λ)
σ2ε
]
.
The first panel of figure 1 illustrates the unconditional expected loss under
transparency (dotted line), under opacity (dashed line), and under optimal de-
gree of transparency (solid line). The parameter values are σ2η = 0.25, ξ = 0.1,
and λ = 1. As (18) shows, full opacity is superior to full transparency when
σ2ε < (λ − 2ξ)σ
2
η = 0.2. The optimal degree of transparency is represented in
the second plot below. As (20) states it, reducing the degree of transparency is
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Figure 1: Unconditional expected loss and optimal degree of transparency
optimal when σ2ε < (2λ − 3ξ)σ
2
η = 0.425. Interestingly, for 0.2 < σ
2
ε < 0.425,
reducing the degree of transparency is optimal even if full transparency is su-
perior to full opacity.
4 Action and information disclosure
We now deal with the main aim of this paper. We analyze the optimal dis-
closure policy when the central bank’s primarily task is to stabilize the econ-
omy. The economy is hit by demand shocks g and the central bank tries to
offset them by implementing its monetary instrument I . The nominal aggre-
gate demand is composed of the demand shock and the monetary instrument,
i.e. y = g+I . Thus firms set their price according to their first and higher-order
expectations about both the demand shock and the monetary instrument. The
central bank’s action is part of the “fundamental" firms respond to. We rewrite
the pricing rule (9) for convenience:
pi = Ei
[
(1− ξ)p + ξg + ξI
]
. (21)
We describe the information structure and derive the equilibrium. We dis-
cuss then the optimal information disclosure when the central bank chooses
between full transparency and opacity, and then whether partial transparency
is optimal.
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4.1 Information structure
Each firm sets its price according to its own belief about both the demand shock
g and the central bank’s instrument I , and its belief about others’ belief about
them. Again, the demand shock is drawn form the real line: g ∈ R. Each firm
receives a private signal gi = g + εi about the demand shock that has the same
properties as in the former section.
Based on its own information D = g + η, the central bank sets its instrument to
offset demand shocks: I = −g − η.7
The central bank then provides firms with information about its instrument (or
economic assessment). When the central bank is transparent, its instrument
is a public signal (common knowledge among firms). Conversely, when it is
opaque, firms’ observation of the instrument does not contain any valuable
information at all. In intermediate situations, the central bank provides firms
with more or less ambiguous information about its instrument. For the sake of
generality, we write the signal disclosed by the central bank and received by
firm i as
Ii = I + φi = −g − η + φi with φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ).
As in the former section, the individual noise φi captures the degree of trans-
parency of the central bank. Full transparency is reached when σ2φ = 0 and
full opacity when the central bank withholds information about its instrument
(σ2φ →∞).
4.2 Equilibrium
To determine the equilibrium behaviour of firms, we proceed as before. Sub-
stituting successively the average price level with higher-order expectations
about the demand shock and the monetary instrument into (21) yields
pi = ξ
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)kEi
[
E¯
(k)(g + I)
]
,
and averaging over firms, we get
p = ξ
∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
[
E¯
(k+1)(g + I)
]
. (22)
The optimal pricing rule of firm i is a weighted average of its first and higher-
order expectations about the demand shock g and the central bank’s instru-
7Since demand shock g has an improper distribution, it is optimal for the central bank to fully
offset its expected shock.
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ment I conditional on its information. Its first-order expectations are
E(g|gi, Ii) =
σ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
gi −
σ2ε
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
Ii = Θ11gi + Θ12Ii
E(I|gi, Ii) = −
σ2φ
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
gi +
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
Ii = Θ21gi + Θ22Ii.
Plugging this result into (22), we have
p =
(
ξ ξ
) ∞∑
k=0
(1− ξ)k
(
Θ11 Θ12
Θ21 Θ22
)k+1 (
g
I
)
and rewriting in a linear form leads to
p = γ1g + γ2I with (23)
γ1 =
ξ(Θ11 + Θ21)
1− (1− ξ)(Θ11 + Θ21)
=
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
= γ2.
The derivation of this equilibrium pricing rule is given in appendix C. When
the central bank stabilizes the economy with its monetary instrument, firms
equally weight their private signal gi and the central bank’s disclosure Ii into
their pricing decision (γ1 = γ2). This arises because firms respond to the nom-
inal aggregate demand that is composed of both the demand shock and the
monetary instrument.
Since the central bank tries to stabilize the economy, it is common knowl-
edge among firms (even under opacity) that the nominal aggregate demand
expected by the central bank is equal to zero. In the particular case where
the central bank has perfect information about demand shocks (σ2η = 0), the
monetary instrument perfectly offsets demand shocks and firms set their price
equal to zero. For the more realistic case where central bank’s information is
noisy, the demand shock is less likely to be precisely offset by the central bank
and thereby the nominal aggregate demand to be zero. Firms then rely more
strongly on their private information gi and disclosure Ii to set their optimal
price ( ∂γ1
∂σ2η
> 0).
When the degree of strategic complementarities increases, firms respond less
strongly to their private signal gi and to the instrument disclosure Ii, and as-
sign a higher weight to the nominal aggregate demand expected by the central
bank (that is to say zero) since the latter is common knowledge (∂γ1
∂ξ
> 0).
When private noises increase, fundamental and strategic uncertainty increases
as well. Hence, firms less strongly respond to their private signal and disclo-
sure and higher weight the nominal demand of zero expected by the central
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bank ( ∂γ1
∂σ2ε
< 0 and ∂γ1
∂σ2
φ
< 0).
4.3 Welfare
We now turn to the welfare analysis. First, the equilibrium firms’ behaviour
(23) implies that the price dispersion across firms satisfies
E
( ∫
i
(pi − p)
2di
)
= E
(∫
i
(γ1gi + γ2Ii − γ1g − γ2I)
2di
)
= γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
φ.
Second, with the central bank stabilizing the economy, the output gap is
E(c2) = E
(
(g + I − p)2
)
= E
(
(g + (−g − η)− γ1g − γ2(−g − η))
2
)
= (γ2 − 1)
2σ2η.
So, since γ1 = γ2, the unconditional expected loss can be written as
E(L) = γ21σ
2
ε + γ
2
1σ
2
φ + λ(γ1 − 1)
2σ2η
=
λ(σ2ε + σ
2
φ) + ξ
2σ2η
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
2
(σ2ε + σ
2
φ)σ
2
η. (24)
4.4 Transparency versus opacity
Opacity The welfare is now computed when the central bank is opaque and
implements its instrument in secret, i.e. σ2φ → ∞. Under opacity, firms set
their price equal to zero since γ1 = 0 and γ2 = 0. In so far as firms know
that the central bank stabilizes the economy but have no information about
the instrument, their private information gi does not help them guessing the
nominal aggregate demand. Their best nominal aggregate demand estimation
is therefore zero and the resulting unconditional expected loss is
E(LO) = λσ
2
η.
Transparency When the central bank is transparent, its monetary instrument
is common knowledge: σ2φ = 0. Under transparency, the pricing rule of firms
becomes
pi =
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
gi +
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
Ii,
and the resulting unconditional expected loss yields
E(LT ) =
( ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
)2
σ2ε + λ
( σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
)2
σ2η.
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Transparency is welfare improving when the loss under opacity LO is larger
than the loss under transparency LT . Comparing both expected losses, we get
the following proposition.
Proposition 3: When the central bank tries to offset demand shocks with its mone-
tary instrument, full transparency is preferable to opacity when
λ >
ξσ2ε
2σ2ε + ξσ
2
η
. (25)
Whether transparency is beneficial depends on the value of four parameters,
the relevance of output gap stabilization at the social level λ, the noise of cen-
tral bank’s information σ2η, the noise of firms’ private information σ
2
ε , and the
degree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ. Note first that transparency is
particularly welfare improving when the weight assigned to the output gap
stabilization λ is large. When the central bank actively shapes the nominal ag-
gregate demand with its monetary instrument, transparency reduces the po-
tential detrimental effect of the policy owing firms to account for it in their
price setting.
Second, transparency improves welfare when central bank’s information is
rather noisy (the derivative of the right-hand side (RHS) of inequation (25) is
negative with respect to central bank’s noise σ2η). When the monetary instru-
ment implemented by the central bank is very likely not to precisely offset the
demand shock, transparency helps reducing the possible distortion generated
by the policy.
Third, switching from opacity to transparency increases the price dispersion
since prices are all homogeneous under opacity (γ1 = 0).
8 The loss linked to
the rise in dispersion depends on the precision of firms’ private information.
High precision of firms’ private information reduces the cross section price dis-
persion. Hence, transparency is welfare improving when firms’ private infor-
mation is rather precise (the derivative of the RHS of inequation (25) is positive
with respect to firms noise σ2ε ).
Fourth, transparency is beneficial when strategic complementarities are strong
(ξ small) because strong complementarities reduces the weight assigned to pri-
vate signals and thereby the cross sectional price dispersion (the derivative of
the RHS of inequation (25) is positive with respect to ξ).
It is worth underlining here that welfare effects of transparency fundamen-
8This mechanism is similar to that of Kondor (2004). He shows that when the fundamental is
split into two parts (as it is the case in this section) more information increases the disagreement
between agents.
19
tally depends on whether the central bank tries to offset demand shocks with
its monetary instrument or not. As discussed in section 3.4, when the central
bank does not influence the nominal aggregate demand, transparency is wel-
fare increasing (compared to opacity) when (i) the output gap stabilization is
socially not very valuable (λ small), (ii) the central bank’s information is quite
accurate (σ2η small), (iii) the firms’ private information is rather noisy (σ
2
ε large),
and (iv) strategic complementarities are strong (ξ small). The conditions for
transparency to be welfare improving in an economy where the central bank
does not influence the nominal aggregate demand are simply the opposite to
that derived in an economy where the central bank partially determines the
nominal aggregate demand with its monetary instrument.
4.5 Optimal degree of transparency
In this section, we allow the central bank to disclose more or less equivocal in-
formation about its instrument and derive the optimal degree of transparency.
The recent development of the US Federal Reserve disclosure about its mon-
etary policy provides a good illustration of various degrees of transparency.
Before 1994, the Federal Reserve did not publicly announce the federal funds
rate it was targeting. The private sector had to observe the market operations
implemented by the trading desk of the Fed to guess the policy decisions of
the Federal Open Market Committee. This lack of transparency was a source
of fundamental uncertainty about the rate targeted by the Fed and of strategic
uncertainty about the beliefs of others about this target. Since February 1994,
the Fed has been publishing the new target after each meeting of the FOMC.
While such a publication reduces uncertainty about the numerical target, un-
certainty still remains about how restrictive or expansive the Fed considers its
policy decision to be. Hence, from 1998 on, the FOMC has decided to indicate
after each meeting its current bias with respect to possible changes in the fu-
ture policy. And even more recently, the FOMC has made the release of the
minutes of its deliberations available to the public.9 This process clearly in-
creases the degree of common knowledge about the impact of monetary policy
on the aggregate nominal demand among firms. While the previous subsection
has compared the welfare under both extreme cases of full transparency and
opacity, we focus now on intermediate level of transparency and determine the
optimal degree of transparency.
To determine the optimal degree of transparency σ2∗φ , we set the first derivative
9See Poole (2005).
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of the loss (24) with respect to σ2φ equal to zero:
∂E(L)
∂σ2φ
= 2γ1
∂γ1
∂σ2φ
σ2ε + γ
2
1 + 2γ1
∂γ1
∂σ2φ
σ2φ − 2λ
∂γ1
∂σ2φ
σ2η + 2λγ1
∂γ1
∂σ2φ
σ2η
=
[(2λ− ξ)σ2ε + ξ
2σ2η + (2λ− ξ)σ
2
φ]ξσ
4
η
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
3
= 0 ⇔ σ2φ =
ξ2
ξ − 2λ
σ2η − σ
2
ε . (26)
To checkwhether extrema lead tominimum expected losses, the second deriva-
tive of the loss with respect to σ2φ yields
∂2E(L)
∂(σ2φ)
2
=
2[(ξ − 2λ)σ2ε + ξ(λ− 2ξ)σ
2
η + (ξ − 2λ)σ
2
φ]ξσ
4
η
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
4
> 0 ⇔ (ξ − 2λ)σ2φ > (2λ− ξ)σ
2
ε + ξ(2ξ − λ)σ
2
η. (27)
We show that limiting the degree of transparency is never optimal. Substitut-
ing equation (26) into (27), we observe that inequation (27) is satisfied when
λ > ξ. That is to say that implementing the degree of transparency given by
the RHS of (26) yields a minimum expected loss only if λ > ξ. But this con-
dition implies that the RHS of (26) is negative. In other words, the extrema
described as in equation (26) are maximum expected losses. As a result, the
optimal disclosure strategy consists of choosing between full transparency and
full opacity according to Proposition 3.
This yields the following proposition:
Proposition 4: When the central bank tries to offset demand shocks with its mone-
tary instrument, partial transparency is never optimal.
In sharp contrast to the economy where the central bank does not stabilize the
nominal aggregate demand, reducing the degree of transparency does not im-
prove welfare when the central bank actively influences the nominal aggregate
demand with its policy. As we bring it up in the next section, the framework
where the central bank stabilizes the economy with its instrument calls for full
transparency under realistic parameter conditions.
5 Discussion
This section compares the optimal information disclosure when the only task of
the central bank is to disclose information with the case where it also stabilizes
the economy. The optimal disclosure in both situations is a function of the
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Figure 3: Optimal information disclosure with
σ2ε
σ2η
= 2
degree of strategic complementarities 1− ξ, the weight assigned to output gap
variability λ, and the relative precision of firms’ private information
σ2ε
σ2η
.
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal disclosure when firms’ private information is
as precise as central bank’s information, i.e.
σ2ε
σ2η
= 1. Figure 3 considers the
more realistic case where firms’ private information is less accurate than central
bank’s information, i.e.
σ2ε
σ2η
= 2.
The optimal disclosure derived in section 3 where the unique central bank’s
task is to disclose is as follows. The dotted line in both figures is given by
λ = (
σ2ε
σ2η
+ 3ξ)/2 (see Proposition 2). As discussed in section 3.5, full trans-
parency is optimal when λ < (
σ2ε
σ2η
+3ξ)/2 while partial transparency is optimal
otherwise. The optimal disclosure is partial transparency for parameter combi-
nations of λ and ξ given by the area called A in both figures. Full transparency
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is optimal for parameter combinations in areas B and C. Partial transparency
is beneficial when the degree of strategic complementarities 1 − ξ is high and
when firms’ private information is relatively accurate. As shown above, opac-
ity is never optimal.10 This arises because of the coordination motive: public
information (or more information) allows private agents to better coordinate.
The optimal degree of transparency (20) indicates that full opacity is optimal
only in the extent that coordination does not matter at all at the social level.
Withholding central bank’s information is optimal when there is no concern
for coordination.
We now turn to the case described in section 4 where the central bank stabi-
lizes the economy with its instrument. The dashed line is given by λ =
ξσ2ε
2σ2ε+ξσ
2
η
(see Proposition 3). As discussed in the previous section, full transparency is
optimal for values of λ larger than the dashed line. So, full transparency is op-
timal for parameter combinations in areas A and B, while opacity is optimal for
area C. The framework of section 4 that accounts for the stabilization purpose
of the central bank makes a case for full transparency in almost all parameter
configurations unless price dispersion is assigned a much higher weight than
output gap stabilization. There is no price dispersion when the central bank
withholds its information since every firm sets a price of zero under opacity
(γ1 = γ2 = 0). But opacity creates however higher cost in terms of output gap
variability.
Yet, the case for opacity is extremely unlikely. For instance, when firms’ pri-
vate information is as accurate as central bank’s information and ξ = 0.25,
opacity would be optimal if the weight assigned to price dispersion would be
more than 9 times higher than that assigned to output gap variability (from
Proposition 3, we obtain λ < ξ2+ξ = 0.11). It is interesting to emphasize that
when central bank’s information becomes less accurate (the relative precision
σ2ε
σ2η
decreases) transparency becomes beneficial for a larger range of parameter
combinations. Since the central bank’s instrument is part of the fundamental
firms respond to, an increase in central bank’s uncertainty makes transparency
more beneficial.
We now briefly discuss the case of microfounded welfare function. As shown
by Adam (2006), the microfounded welfare function is given by equation (10)
with λ = ξ
θ
where θ > 1 is the degree of substitutability in the Dixit-Stiglitz
10This finding is consistent with Cornand and Heinemann (2005) who show that partial dissem-
ination of public information is always preferable to withholding public information.
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aggregator. Plugging the microfounded weight λ into (20), we get
σ2∗φ = max[0, (2
ξ
θ
− 3ξ)σ2η − σ
2
ε︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
] = 0.
When the central bank does not stabilize the economy with its instrument, full
transparency is always optimal for the microfounded welfare function. This
has been underlined by Hellwig (2005): when coordination is socially highly
valuable transparency is welfare improving since it helps coordinating.
By contrast, when the central bank tries to stabilize the nominal aggregate de-
mand with its instrument, the microfounded welfare function can lead to full
opacity. As Proposition 3 indicates, opacity is superior to transparency when
coordination is socially highly valuable (λ small). For large value of θ, the
weight λ becomes arbitrarily small and may call for opacity (area C in figures
2 and 3).
6 Conclusion
Can a central bank speak too much? This question has been the subject of a
very controversial literature over the last years. While transparency has been
an important point of central banks’ agenda, the argument by Morris and Shin
(2002) has received a great deal of attention because it seems to contradict
the general presumption that transparency is always beneficial. According to
their analysis, the disclosure of central bank’s noisy information can be wel-
fare detrimental and destabilizing since it serves as a focal point in a context
of strategic complementarities. The current paper contributes to this ongoing
debate by highlighting the dual tasks of monetary policy: action and commu-
nication. While the literature in the vein of M-S considers the case where the
sole task of the central bank is to provide the private sector with information,
we also account for the action task of the central bank and draw opposite con-
clusions: when central bank’s information is poorly accurate, transparency re-
duces the distorting effect of the monetary instrument.
This finding challenges the stabilizing role of public disclosure under imper-
fect information. Our analysis highlights the beneficial effects of transparency
when the stabilization policy of the central bank is implemented on the base of
imprecise information. Yet, in monetary policy, decisions under imperfect in-
formation are rather the rule than the exception. Indeed, since monetary policy
affects the economy with a substantial delay, central banks must act in advance
and take their decisions according to their forecasts. The Inflation Reports of the
Bank of England provide a good example of the information accuracy a central
24
bank bases its decision on. As an inflation targeter, the Bank of Englandmainly
conducts its policy in compliance with its expected inflation and output growth
that are published in its Inflation Report. The uncertainty surrounding central
bank’s forecasts is surprisingly high. As pointed out by Morris and Shin (2005)
for the August 2005 Report, the “fan chart" for output growth looks rather like
a “hammer" than a “fan". Under these circumstances, the instrument set by the
central bank may well be proved inadequate for the actual state of the econ-
omy.
Our analysis addresses the question of central bank’s communication when
the conduct of monetary policy suffers from inaccurate information and shows
that transparency helps reducing the distortion associated with poorly suited
policies. This result supports the recent development in central banking to-
wards more transparency with respect to policy implementations.
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A Limited publicity versus limited transparency
As Morris and Shin (2002) show, firms overreact to the public signal because it
is common knowledge among them. Consequently, limiting the degree of com-
mon knowledge reduces the overreaction and may improve welfare. Which
disclosure strategies can reduce the degree of common knowledge? This ap-
pendix compares two strategies and shows that they are strictly equivalent for
a large class of coordination games.
First, the central bank can reduce the degree of transparency by disclosing its
information with idiosyncratic noise to each firm. This strategy has been pro-
posed by Heinemann and Illing (2002) and is discussed in section 3. The dis-
closure received by firm i is given by
Ii = I + φi = g + η + φi with φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ).
Each firm receives the central bank’s disclosure in private. This disclosure
strategy captures the so-called mystique of central banks’ speech, i.e. the ambi-
guity surrounding the interpretation of central banks’ message. Indeed, central
banks are known for speaking with some ambiguity that gives rise to funda-
mental and strategic uncertainty about the interpretation of their speeches.
Second, the central bank can reduce the degree of publicity by disclosing its in-
formation with perfect precision but not to all agents. This strategy has been
proposed by Cornand and Heinemann (2005). In this set-up, a fraction S of
agents receives the semi-public signal D = g + η in addition to its private sig-
nal gi = g + εi while the other fraction 1− S only gets its private signal.
A.1 Information structure
We allow now the central bank to dispose of both disclosure strategies simul-
taneously. So, we have
• a fraction S of firms who gets a private signal and a central bank’s disclo-
sure
– gi = g + εi with εi ∼ N(0, σ
2
ε)
– Di = g + η + φi with η ∼ N(0, σ
2
η) and φi ∼ N(0, σ
2
φ).
σ2φ captures the degree of transparency of the central bank’s disclosure
and drives the degree of common knowledge among the fraction S of
firms that gets the disclosure.
• a fraction 1− S of firms who only get a private signal
– gi = g + εi.
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A.2 Equilibrium action
The average equilibrium action of the fraction 1 − S receiving only a private
signal is given by
p1−S = g
since private signals gi are centred on the true value g.
The average equilibrium action of the fraction S receiving both a private signal
and a central bank’s disclosure is given by
pS = γ1g + γ2D
=
(1− (1− ξ)S)σ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + (1− (1− ξ)S)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
g +
σ2ε
σ2ε + (1− (1− ξ)S)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
D.
The overall average equilibrium action (over both fractions of firms with and
without central bank’s disclosure) can be written as
p = Γ1g + Γ2D
= S · pS + (1− S) · p1−S
= S(γ1g + γ2D) + (1− S)g
= (Sγ1 + 1− S)g + Sγ2D
=
(1− S)σ2ε + (1− (1− ξ)S)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + (1− (1− ξ)S)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
g +
Sσ2ε
σ2ε + (1− (1− ξ)S)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
D.
A.3 Welfare
We consider the general form of social loss
L =
∫
i
(pi − p)
2di + λ(g − p)2, (28)
where λ describes to what extent coordination is socially valuable. Using equi-
librium actions of our set-up, we express the unconditional expected loss as
E(L) = E
[
S
∫
S
(γ1gi + γ2Di − Γ1g − Γ2D)
2di + (1− S)
∫
(1−S)
(gi − Γ1g − Γ2D)
2di
+λ(g − Γ1g − Γ2D)
2
]
= S[γ21σ
2
ε + (1− S)
2γ22σ
2
η + γ
2
2σ
2
φ] + (1− S)[σ
2
ε + Γ2σ
2
η] + λΓ
2
2σ
2
η
= S[γ21σ
2
ε + (1− S + λS)γ
2
2σ
2
η + γ
2
2σ
2
φ] + (1− S)σ
2
ε . (29)
As discussed in section 3.3, the welfare in M-S given by −
∫
i
(pi − g)
2di is a
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particular case of (28) where λ = 1. The corresponding unconditional expected
loss with full publicity (i.e. S = 1) and full transparency (i.e. σ2φ = 0) is
E(LMS) = γ
2
1σ
2
ε + γ
2
2σ
2
η
=
σ2εσ
2
η(σ
2
ε + ξ
2σ2η)
(σ2ε + ξσ
2
η)
2
.
A.4 Optimal transparency
A.4.1 Transparency versus opacity
We address the question whether full transparency (σ2φ = 0) is superior to full
opacity (σ2φ → ∞) in terms of welfare (29). It is straightforward to show that
transparency is superior to opacity if
S2λ− 2 + 3S − S2 − 2Sξ
2− S
<
σ2ε
σ2η
. (30)
In the particular case where the degree of publicity is maximal (S=1), we get
condition (18) in the text.
A.4.2 Optimal degree of transparency
General case We derive the optimal degree of transparency σ2∗φ . The degree
of publicity S is considered as given. The first derivative of the unconditional
expected loss (29) with respect to σ2φ is
∂E(L)
∂σ2φ
=
(σ2ε + (1− S − 2λS + 3ξS)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ)Sσ
4
ε
(σ2ε + (1− S(1− ξ)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
3
= 0 ⇔ σ2φ = (S − 1 + 2Sλ− 3Sξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε . (31)
We ensure that extrema yield minimum losses. The second derivative of the
expected loss with respect to σ2φ leads to
∂2E(L)
∂(σ2φ)
2
=
−2Sσ4ε(σ
2
ε + (1− S − 3Sλ + 4Sξ)σ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
(σ2ε + (1− (1− ξ)Sσ
2
η + σ
2
φ)
4
> 0 ⇔ σ2φ < (S − 1 + 3Sλ− 4Sξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε . (32)
To show that reducing the degree of transparency according to (31) always
leads to aminimum expected loss, we plug (31) into (32). The second derivative
of the expected loss is then positive only if ξ < λ, which turns to be a necessary
condition for the optimal variance σ2φ of (31) to be positive (the expression (S−
1 + 2Sλ − 3Sξ) is larger than zero only if ξ < λ). This means that when (31)
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calls for increasing σ2φ (i.e. reducing transparency), the resulting expected loss
is a minimum.
One can show that when the right hand side (RHS) of (31) is negative, condi-
tion (30) is always satisfied. So, full transparency is always superior to opacity
when the (RHS) of equation (31) is negative.
For the sake of generality, the optimal degree of transparency is given by
σ2∗φ = max[0, (S − 1 + 2Sλ− 3Sξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε ]. (33)
Reducing the degree of transparency is optimal improving when the precision
of central bank’s information 1/σ2η is low, when the weight λ assigned to eco-
nomic stabilization is large, when complementarities are strong (ξ small), and
when the degree of publicity is large.
σ2∗φ > 0 ⇔ S(1 + 2λ− 3ξ) >
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2η
.
Full publicity For the particular case of full publicity (i.e. S = 1) discussed
in section 3 we have:
∂E(L)
∂σ2φ
= 0 ⇔ σ2φ = (2λ− 3ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε (34)
∂2E(L)
∂(σ2φ)
2
> 0 ⇔ σ2φ < (3λ− 4ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε (35)
To show that reducing the degree of transparency according to (34) always
leads to a minimum expected loss, we plug (34) into (35). The second deriva-
tive of the expected loss is then positive only if ξ < λ, which turns to be a
necessary condition for the optimal variance σ2φ of (34) to be positive (the ex-
pression (2λ− 3ξ) is larger than zero only if ξ < λ). This means that when (34)
calls for increasing σ2φ (i.e. reducing transparency), the resulting expected loss
is a minimum.
We now check whether transparency is superior to opacity when the RHS of
equation (34) is negative. We distinguish two cases. First, when ξ < λ, the
condition (2λ−3ξ) <
σ2ε
σ2η
(for negative RHS of (34)) implies (λ−2ξ) <
σ2ε
σ2η
, which
calls for full transparency according to (18). Second, when ξ > λ, condition (18)
is always satisfied and full transparency optimal. As a result, full transparency
is always superior to opacity when the RHS of equation (34) is negative.
The optimal degree of transparency is given by
σ2∗φ = max[0, (2λ− 3ξ)σ
2
η − σ
2
ε ]. (36)
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This is equation (20) in the text.
A.5 Optimal publicity
A.5.1 Full versus zero publicity
Again, we address the question whether full publicity (S = 1) is superior to
zero publicity (S = 0). One can show that full publicity is superior to zero
publicity in terms of welfare (29) if
(λ− 2ξ) <
σ2ε + σ
2
φ
σ2η
. (37)
In the particular case where the central bank’s disclosure is fully transparent
(σ2φ = 0), the condition for full publicity is identical to the condition for full
transparency (under full publicity) (18) in the text. In other words, the condi-
tion for full publicity under full transparency is identical to the condition for
full transparency under full publicity.
A.5.2 Optimal degree of publicity
General case We derive the optimal degree of publicity S∗. The central bank
seeks to determine the optimal degree of publicity for a given degree of trans-
parency σ2φ. The first and second derivatives of the unconditional expected loss
(29) are given by
∂E(L)
∂S
= 0 ⇔ S =
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
(1 + 2λ− 3ξ)σ2η
(38)
∂2E(L)
∂S2
> 0 ⇔ (λ− 1 + S + 2Sλ− 2(2 + λ)Sξ + 3Sξ2)σ2η
+(λ− 1)(σ2ε + σ
2
φ) > 0. (39)
Substituting (38) into (39), we see that the extrema yield a minimum expected
loss if and only if λ > ξ. This is however a necessary condition for the RHS of
(38) to be positive.
For the case where the RHS of (38) is negative, we see that (1 + 2λ − 3ξ) < 0
implies (λ − 2ξ) < 0, which calls for zero publicity according to (37). For the
case where the RHS of (38) is greater than 1, we rewrite it as (2λ− 3ξ) <
σ2ε+σ
2
φ
σ2η
and see that it implies the condition for full publicity (37) when λ > ξ, which
turns to be a necessary condition for the RHS of (38) to be greater than 1 (or
even positive).
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For the sake of generality, the optimal degree of publicity is given by
S∗ = min[1,max(0,
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
(1 + 2λ− 3ξ)σ2η
)]. (40)
Reducing the degree of publicity is optimal when the precision of central bank’s
information 1/σ2η is low, when the weight assigned to stabilization λ is large,
when complementarities are strong (ξ small), and when the degree of trans-
parency is large (σ2φ small).
S∗ < 1 ⇔ 2λ− 3ξ >
σ2ε + σ
2
φ
σ2η
.
Full transparency When the central bank’s disclosure is common knowledge
among receivers (σ2φ = 0), the condition for limiting publicity becomes
S∗ < 1 ⇔ 2λ− 3ξ >
σ2ε
σ2η
. (41)
Note that the RHS of (38) is negative when
S∗ < 0 ⇔ 1 + 2λ− 3ξ < 0,
what must be foreclosed because it has no economic sense. Since Cornand and
Heinemann (2005) consider the case where λ = 1 (as in M-S), the RHS of (38) is
never negative in their analysis.
A.6 Welfare under optimal degree of publicity vs. transparency
We analyze the welfare (29) when the central bank implements the optimal
degree of transparency (33) or the optimal degree of publicity (40).
It turns out that the loss under both disclosure strategies is strictly identical
and is given by
E(L∗) = σ2ε +
σ4ε
4σ2η(ξ − λ)
.
A.7 Publicity-transparency equivalence
Since implementing a limited degree of publicity or a limited degree of trans-
parency yields the same welfare, the central bank can indifferently implement
one of both disclosure strategies to reduce the degree of common knowledge
about its disclosure. The relation between the degree of publicity S and the
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degree of transparency σ2φ is
σ2φ =
1− S
S
(σ2ε + σ
2
η) or S =
σ2ε + σ
2
η
σ2ε + σ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
Interestingly, while the weight λ assigned to economic stabilization in the wel-
fare drives the optimal degree of publicity or transparency (optimal publicity
or transparency are lowwhen coordination is given a small weight at the social
level), it does not challenge the publicity-transparency equivalence result.
B Linear pricing rule: pure information disclosure
This appendix solves the rational expectations equilibrium for the pricing rule
of firms given by equation (15).
We first postulate that the optimal price of firm i is a linear combination of its
two signals
pi = γ1gi + γ2Di. (42)
The optimal weights γ1 and γ2 depend on firms’ expectations about the pric-
ing behaviour of other firms. The conditional estimate of the average price is
therefore given by
Ei(p) = γ1Ei(g) + γ2Ei(D). (43)
Plugging Ei(p) in the pricing rule (11) and replacing the expectations of firm i
about g and D yields
pi = (1− ξ)[γ1Ei(g) + γ2Ei(D)] + ξEi(g)
= (1− ξ)[γ1(Ω11gi + Ω12Di) + γ2(Ω21gi + Ω22Di)] + ξ(Ω11gi + Ω12Di).
Rearranging gives
pi = gi[(1− ξ)(Ω11γ1 + Ω21γ2) + ξΩ11]
+Di[(1− ξ)(Ω12γ1 + Ω22γ2) + ξΩ12].
Identifying the coefficients, we get
γ1 =
(1− ξ)Ω21γ2 + ξΩ11
1− (1− ξ)Ω11
γ2 =
(1− ξ)Ω12γ1 + ξΩ12
1− (1− ξ)Ω22)
.
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And solving this system of equations yields
γ1 =
ξΩ11 + (1− ξ)Ω21
1− (1− ξ)(Ω11 − Ω21)
=
ξσ2η + σ
2
φ
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
γ2 =
ξΩ12 + (1− ξ)Ω12Ω21
ξ − (1− ξ)[ξΩ11 − (1 + ξ)Ω21 − (1− ξ)(Ω21 − Ω11)Ω11]
=
σ2ε
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
This solution is equivalent to equations (16) in the text.
C Linear pricing rule: Action and information dis-
closure
This appendix solves the rational expectations equilibrium for the pricing rule
of firms given by equation (21).
We first postulate that the optimal price of firm i is a linear combination of its
two signals
pi = γ1gi + γ2Ii. (44)
The optimal weights γ1 and γ2 depend on firms’ expectations about the pric-
ing behaviour of other firms. The conditional estimate of the average price is
therefore given by
Ei(p) = γ1Ei(g) + γ2Ei(I). (45)
Plugging Ei(p) in the pricing rule (21) and replacing the expectations of firm i
about g and I yields
pi = (1− ξ)[γ1Ei(g) + γ2Ei(I)] + ξEi(g) + ξEi(I)
= (1− ξ)[γ1(Θ11gi + Θ12Ii) + γ2(Θ21gi + Θ22Ii)]
+ξ(Θ11gi + Θ12Ii) + ξ(Θ21gi + Θ22Ii).
Rearranging gives
pi = gi[(1− ξ)(Θ11γ1 + Θ21γ2) + ξ(Θ11 + Θ21)]
+Ii[(1− ξ)(Θ12γ1 + Θ22γ2) + ξ(Θ12 + Θ22)].
Identifying the coefficients, we get
γ1 =
(1− ξ)Θ21γ2 + ξ(Θ11 + Θ21)
1− (1− ξ)Θ11
γ2 =
(1− ξ)Θ12γ1 + ξ(Θ12 + Θ22)
1− (1− ξ)Θ22
.
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And solving this system of equations yields
γ1 =
ξ(Θ11 + Θ21)
1− (1− ξ)(Θ11 + Θ21)
=
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
γ2 =
ξσ2η
σ2ε + ξσ
2
η + σ
2
φ
.
This solution is equivalent to equation (23) in the text.
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